




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The British Intervention Policy in the Malay States: A General Strategic View

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ABSTRACT: *This article highlights and discusses significant factors and events affecting the British intervention policy in the Peninsular Malay States in the 19th century during the colonial era as seen from the strategic perspectives with regard to the British foreign policy at that time. Certain variations to the British approaches are also highlighted with greater emphasis given in the deliberation of the general comparative analysis based on economic and politico-security factors thorough a general strategic studies view. The article also debates on crucial factors triggering the change in the British's foreign policy such as the economic downturn in most European countries in the 19th century. The article also emphasizes the strategic views based on power race, and fears in British considerations, were the peculiar elements and factors that came under the mainstream of political and security dimensions determining Britain's foreign and intervention policies essential to the survival of its economic and political endeavours in the Southeast Asian sub-region by adopted the realism thought. Finally, the article suggests that the impacts of the British intervention policy on the Malay States need to be further deliberated, studied and incorporated in the Malaysian's strategic studies. The significance of certain events such as the 1824 creation of the demarcation line by the British and the Dutch, and the treaty between the British and the Siamese government in 1909 all of which contributed to the breaking up of the Malay world, a result that can be felt even in the present day, should be analyses in detail. In a different positive light, the article also looks into the foundation of the modern Malay nation imposed by the British such as the establishment of the Straits Settlement, the federated Malay States, and the non-federated Malay States was not a mere coincident but was in fact part of a well-planned colonial scheme in a long-view of the strategic values of the sea-control strategy of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea and part of the British grand strategy in the context of power balance to counter the threats from the north of Malay Peninsular.*

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1. Introduction

The emergence of foreign powers in the Southeast Asian sub-region was a result of changing western policies from mercantilism to imperialism and followed by colonialism in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. The other factors luring the western powers to the east are economic expansion, promoting trading activities, improving, strengthening and enhancing their image as super powers while spreading the teachings of Christianity. The abundance of raw material and high population density necessary to fuel their economic activities added to the attraction.

The British expedition to the East, Southeast Asian sub-region in particular, came about in the early part of 16th century with the establishment of the British East Indies Company to conduct trading in the region. Trading posts were established in various places like Bantam, Banda, Maluku, Sulawesi, Borneo, Siam (Thailand), Sumatera, Java and Ambon. These activities had led the British to come into conflict with the Dutch culminating in the Ambon massacre on 23 February 1623. In the aftermath, the British Indies Company's trading posts in the sub-region were closed except in Bengkulu which focused its activities on the Indian subcontinent.

The middle of 18th century, with a significant development of tea, silks and pottery trading between British-India and China, saw the re-emergence of the British in Southeast Asia. Given the scenario, there was a growing need for an establishment of a strategic British trading centre in the region especially along the Straits of Malacca. In addition, the geographical distance from Bengkulu in Sumatera to the strategic lane of sea communication did not allow for effective control over the trading activities along the maritime-littoral line stretching from India through the Straits of Malacca and up to China. Since the Dutch were more interested in the areas of Sumatera and Java, the British were looking for the opportunity to set up a trading centre along the west coastal line of Peninsular Malaya.

While the British maintained its non-intervention policy in their dealings with the states in the Southeast Asian sub-region, the British East Indies Company, on the other hand, was looking after its trading activities while establishing trading concession in the region. The option of indirect intervention would be taken if the need arises or should something happen and threatens their economic interest and trading activities between the British and the Malay States or China. The Anglo-Dutch Agreement 1824 which serves as the 'demarcation line' in Southeast Asian history marks the turning point of the British foreign policy towards the sub-region; thus the change in British policy from non-intervention to intervention. There are considerably a number of factors leading to the change in policy in towards the Malay States in the 1900's especially.

2. The Non-Intervention and Indirect Intervention Policy

In order to better to appreciate the factors that led to the shift in British's policy to intervention in the 19th century, one needs to understand the previous policy of non-intervention, its form, how it was practiced and how the shift came about. In view of their occupation of Penang in the late 1800's, questions have been raised as to the extent the non-intervention policy was practiced in the 18th century. One may argue that the non-intervention policy was merely a front to intervene in the affairs of the Malay States. Some historians describe the policy as two folds: non-intervention and the other is so called indirect intervention policy because the British kept a close watch on the development of internal affairs of the Malay States via the Straits Settlements establishment. When the British occupied Penang (1791)ⁱ, Singapore (1819)ⁱⁱ and Malacca (1824)ⁱⁱⁱ and with the establishment of the Straits Settlement in 1826 which was governed by a British Governor, it provides an indication that the British were practicing indirect intervention policy since it had yet to interfere in the local administration and the absolute monarchy of the Malay sultanates still stands.

3. Factors Leading To Non-Intervention Policy

Prior to 1874, there was ambiguity in the British foreign policy given their reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of the Malay States despite the pressures exerted by the British East Indies. The ambiguity could be construed as deliberate and the actual underlying plan has to remain tacit for reasons as follows:

Upholding the initial objective on East Asia region. The British government was to uphold economic interest as its main objective in maintaining their presence in the East Asia region. The establishment of the British East Indies Companies in 1600 was for the purpose of gaining profit and boosting trading activities in the region. In order to maintain good relationship with the local chieftains the non-intervention policy needs to be observed.

To avoid any arrangement and agreement. With the enactment of Pitt Act in 1874, the British East Indies Company was forewarned not to enter into any arrangement or agreement with the local authorities especially in the matters related to political disputes to ensure that they will not be dragged into war thus interfering with their economic activities.

To maintain good friendship and trading relationship with the Siamese. The British saw that maintaining a good relationship with the Siamese was in the best interest for both parties due to certain economic and security advantages to be gained by the British via economic activities in Siam, Myanmar and the Northern Malay States. The British also saw Siam as a buffer state and part of their grand strategy of balance of power^{iv} to counter the spread of French and other Western powers from Indochina to the rest of Southeast Asian sub-region namely Siamese territory and the Malay States.

China's isolation policy. China, in 1833, put into practice the isolation policy in its dealings with foreign countries especially with the western powers. The policy had a strong impact on British trading activities in East Asian region as well as in Southeast Asian sub-region. The British were faced with competition from the other European capitalists in trading activities. Hence they believed that intervention policy in local politico-security affairs could only lead to economic and financial downfall should there be trouble.

4. The Indirect Intervention Policy

There were incidents that led to the believe that the British was trying to defend its non-intervention policy in the Malay States, namely, the 1821 invasion of Kedah by the Siamese, Low Agreement on 18 October 1826 between Captain James Low and the Sultan of Perak, 1833 Linggi Civil War, and the appeal from Raja Yusof to interfere in the internal affairs of Perak in 1869. However, there were occasions where the British was seen to be practicing 'double standard' in the implementation of the policy giving the impression that the British has the intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Malay States. These actions are construed as indirect intervention policy in order to safeguard its interest and protect its economic activities. The policy can be categorized into two folds:

Through Conflict with the Malay States. The Naning war provides an example of the implication of the British-Dutch Agreement 1824. When the British first came into power, the then Governor of the Straits Settlement, Robert Fullerton, imposed the tort law, judiciary order and taxes in Malacca and the district of Naning was included because as they see it, Naning was part of Malacca. The implementation of the administrative order had challenged the authority of the local chieftains especially Dol Said and resulted in 1831-32 war. The defeat of Dol Said followed by the abolishment of his title and the appointment of a British Administrator in his place give a clear indication of the British intention of intervention. In another incident, the internal conflict involving the Pahang royal families of Wan Ahmad and Wan Mutahir had led to civil war thus causing instability and interferes with economic activities and threatened British interest in the states of Terengganu and Pahang. When the situation worsened with the intervention of the Siamese, the British, with the intention to protect its interest, sent its naval vessels to repel the Siamese in Terengganu in 1862, and forced them to withdraw.

Through Treaties. There were two significant treaties that provided the British with opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the Malay States. The first is the 31st July 1825 treaty between Captain Henry Burney, representing the Governor of the Straits Settlement, Robert Fullerton, and the Siamese government. The objective of the treaty was to end the Siamese's hegemonic expansion in the Malay States including Kedah, Perak and Selangor. This gave the British ample time to spread its influence on the states without much interference and resistance. The other treaty involved Stamford Raffles and the royal family of Johore sultanate which was represented by Tengku Hussein on 6th February 1819 with the condition that: British was to be allowed to occupy the Singapore island and that Tengku Hussein was to be recognized as the legitimate Sultan of Johore. The immediate implications of the treaty were: the establishment of Singapore as the center of administration of the Straits Settlement and Johore-Riau was split into two umbrellas – the British and the Dutch dominations.

5. THE DIRECT INTERVENTION POLICY

Early 1870's saw the British policy towards the Malay States' internal affairs became 'more clearer and aggressive.' Economic development and changes in political scenario in Britain gave rise to a shift in its foreign policy towards the Malay States from non-intervention to intervention. In September 1873, the Secretary of Land Office, Lord Kimberley, decided to change the policy and a year later caused the first direct intervention in Perak through Pangkor Treaty (1874), followed by Selangor, Sungai Ujong (Negeri Sembilan) and Pahang. The Malay States' internal problems, internal development in the British

government, and external factors in Europe and the Southeast Asian region have all contributed to the change in British's foreign policy. All in all the factors can be categorized into two types depending on the consequences: politico-security and economic. Some of the factors leading to the British intervention under the two folds could be further categorized as immediate or mediating factors.

6. Economic Factors

Economic interest is an evolving and 'patron' factor in nature influencing politico-security circumstances. The British's economic interest could be examined and understood through events and pieces of information as follows:

Economic Interests and Attractions. The conditions in Europe in the 19th century as a result of Cultural and Industrial Revolutions opened up British's interest into looking for new territories to market its products and to acquire raw materials to support industrial needs. The growing food industry in Britain required an increasing amount of tin, but its reserve stock was depleting. Thus it was no surprise that the British have had their eyes on the Malays States even during the setting up of the Straits Settlement. The 1848 discovery of tin in Taiping brought a better prospect for tin and other related industries that called for British intervention.

In the last two-thirds of the 19th century British economic dominance in commerce, shipping and manufacturing industry had largely dictated the nature of its foreign economic policies. In Southeast Asia, the 1824 treaty with the Dutch had influenced Britain's bustling and profitable economic activities. But in 1860's and 1870's, it became increasingly clear that a major shift was taking place in the international economy. In particular, the British manufacturing and trading leadership were encountering increasingly effective competition from rapidly industrializing rivals such as Germany and the United States. The development of the Bismarkian unification, domestic 'liberalism,' and paternalistic authoritarianism which were transforming Germany into a major power had given the British a stiff competition in maintaining its 'status' as the most dominant superpower at the time. The western powers constellations in 18th and 19th centuries are as shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Industrial Per Capita Level, 1750 – 1900 (in Million US Dollars)^v

Nations	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
Britain	10	16	25	64	87	100
Habsburg Empire	7	7	8	11	15	23
France	9	9	12	20	28	39
Germany	8	8	9	15	25	52
Italy	8	8	8	10	12	17
Russia	6	6	7	8	10	15
United States	4	9	14	21	38	69
Other European Countries	8	8	11	16	24	35
Japan	7	7	7	7	9	12
China	8	6	6	4	4	3
India	7	6	6	3	2	1
Third World	7	6	6	4	3	2

Table 2: Industrial Relative Output 1750 – 1900 (Percentage)^{vi}

Nations	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
Britain	1.9	4.3	9.5	19.9	22.9	18.5
Habsburg Empire	2.9	3.2	3.2	4.2	4.4	4.7
France	4.0	4.2	5.2	7.9	7.8	6.8
Germany	2.9	3.5	3.5	4.9	8.5	13.2
Italy	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5
Russia	5.0	5.6	5.6	7.0	7.6	8.8
United States	0.1	0.8	2.4	7.2	14.7	23.6
Other European Countries	23.2	28.1	34.2	53.2	61.3	62.0

Nations	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
Japan	3.8	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.4
China	32.8	33.3	29.8	19.7	12.5	6.2
India	24.5	19.7	17.6	8.6	2.8	1.7
Third World	73.0	67.7	60.5	36.6	20.9	11.0

The tremendous industrial development in the United States after the end of the civil war and growing exports had led to huge demand for raw materials, all of which were fueling keen interest in the further shores of the Asia-Pacific region. The great depression had contributed to the decline in British's century old power supremacy leading to social dislocation and increase in unemployment. Britain's share of world trade shrank from 23 percent in 1876 to 19 percent in 1885, whereas the UK international trade had grown at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent between 1841-71, it achieved a rate of only 2.9 percent between 1870 and 1900 (and of 2.5 percent between 1880 and 1910)^{vii}.

Protection of the British Companies in Economic Investments and Concessions in the Malay States. Some British companies had been investing a substantial amount in economic activities and mining in Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Selangor and Pahang, but the additional benefit from the investment was disequilibria due to internal factors such as anarchic conditions in the Malay States and the poor production from the mining activities due to the traditional techniques used. According to Caldwell, "*...entrepreneurs – both British and Chinese – had succeeded in devising a great variety of means of profiting from the neighbouring Malay states. However, as alien-oriented economic activities multiplied in the peninsular, they subtly undermined traditional socio-political structures, and gave rise to the kind of disturbances, which were as we noted, to afford a pretext for direct British intervention.*"^{viii}

Given the situation, the Chinese and the British traders, who were supported by the Straits Settlement government, put forward a letter of appeal to the British Land Office Secretary, Lord Kimberley, urging the British government to intervene in the internal Malay states affairs to recover the political situation and economic interest. In 1872, there were strong petitions from the Chambers of Commerce of Malacca and Singapore, and in 1873, 248 Chinese merchants in the Straits Settlements made another appeal. In short, everyone, Europeans and Chinese, who invested capitals in the Malay States had every interest in bringing pressure on the British government to take such steps as would safeguard their monies and enterprise,^{ix} a fact supported by Yip Yat Hoong, "*Naturally, frustrated European owners of capital in the Straits Settlements constituted one interest group pressing for British intervention in the Malay States. Those involved in the tin industry were clearly another. Demand for tin rose steadily throughout the 19th century, in response to developments such as the food canning industry, and the manufacture of tin-plated oil barrels and corrugated.*"^x

The need for Better Infrastructures and Guaranteed Investments. As a result of increasing consumption of raw material in Britain, a need for better infrastructures such as railway and all-weather condition roads in the Malay States to provide for faster transportation compared to traditional routes became more discerning. This fact can be readily proven because once the British imposed the Residential System, under the social policy reforms, it attuned the construction of social capital in tin mines and rubber plantation sectors under the Federated of Malay States expenditure, where between 1900 to 1912, more than half went on such public works such as roads, railways and docks.^{xi}

7. Politico-Security Factors

Politico-security factors played a crucial role in British's intervention of the Malay States. The notion of realism is prevalent in the British's foreign policy in order to sustain and retain its interest and uphold the superpower status in the region. Several factors contributed to this policy are:

Western Powers Search of a New Colony. The nineteenth century was a period of imperialism and colonialism among western powers where they were spreading their national interest outside of the European countries. The condition in East Asia especially in the Southeast Asian sub-region in the early part of the 19th century saw the emergence of western powers racing to look for new territories as a result of Europe's 18th century Cultural and 19th century Industrial Revolutions. The then superpowers of Germany, France, the United States, Italy and Russia were competing with one another to 'grasp' raw materials to have a greater control over the market. As put by Caldwell, "*France, for instance, was busily*

engaged in extending its control and influence to the north – in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. American nationals were eagerly in pursuit of economic openings through the region and had already – from the British point of view – encroached upon inviolable British interests in both North Borneo and North Sumatra. However significantly, it was Germany, which seemed to pose the most tangible threat.”^{xii}

The opening of the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Seas in 1869 by Ferdinand de Lessep shortened the distance in journey from Europe to Asia. This development gave the western powers a further encouragement to extend their national interests in regions of the East. Hence, securing the Straits of Malacca to have control over shipping activities was of the utmost importance in achieving all the other British's objectives. Even though the Dutch has control over the southern region, it did not run all the way up to the east coast or to the northern tip of Sumatra. There was a constant threat from a third and potentially hostile and expansionist power gaining a foothold in independent Aceh.^{xiii} Therefore intervention in the Malay States up to the north would effectively strengthen the British domination over the straits.

Race of Western Powers in Southeast Asian Sub-Region. Prior to the 1870's, most of the territories in the Southeast Asian sub-region had been occupied by the western powers – the French in Indochina, Spanish in the Philippines and the Dutch in Indonesia. The only areas yet to be occupied directly by the western powers were Siam and the Malay States. The other western powers like Germany, Russia, Italy and the United States were waiting for opportunity for them to occupy these areas which were rich in raw materials where internal problems of anarchical society of the Malay States were rife. The British's fear towards other western powers became more obvious especially towards the Germans who after its unification under Otto von Bismarck in 1871 had conducted a secret meeting with the Sultan of Kedah on the Langkawi Island's potential to be set up as the German's naval base. Germany, together with its booming and highly efficient industry, disciplined and hard-working population, strong military traditions, and imperial ambitions openly expressed, posed a special threat to the British. By 1871, there is an increase in the number of German firms in Singapore, and the German navy was ostentatiously making its presence felt in the region.^{xiv} On top of these, there were hidden agendas among the Malay States' royal families including obtaining military assistance from the other western powers should the British refuse to do so. Politico-military-strategic objectives were the intention of western traders investing in economic activities in the region. This could have been the single most important factor influencing the shift in the British's foreign policy into direct intervention in the Malay States, which went along in line with the classical realist tradition thinking at that time.^{xv}

Anarchical Problems in the Malay States. In 1860's and early 1870's, the conditions in the west coastal Malay States, namely Perak, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan were politically unstable due to a number of factors. The first is the power struggle within the royal families where upon seeing the prosperity the states were enjoying from their economic activities and the potential in tax to be collected as the authoritative body, the Malay rulers were vying to be the absolute monarchy.^{xvi} Second, the clash and fighting between the Chinese secret societies of ethnics or clans, next, piracy problem^{xvii} and finally civil war between the Malay rulers. In Perak, the power struggle occurred between Raja Abdullah and Sultan Ismail upon the death of Sultan Ali. The power struggle worsened when it involved the local chieftains and the Chinese clans, specifically the Ghee Hin and Hai San, leading to three series of Larut Civil wars from 1861 to 1874 over the claim on Kelang District which had a big reserve of tin. Whereas in Negeri Sembilan a fight between Datuk Kelana and Datuk Bandar over the authority to collect taxes in Sungai Linggi. These unhealthy developments and series of troubles in the Malay States stemmed from gang warfare between rival groups of miners causing agitation in the business circles in the Straits Settlements.

Change of Leadership Pattern in Britain. Before 1871, Liberal Party ruled the state and practiced 'anti-imperialism' in its foreign policy which was appropriate to maintain good and cordial relations with the Malay States to avoid war that would require a vast amount of military expenditure. After 1871, the new leadership under Conservative Party led by Benjamin Disraeli, the new Prime Minister adopted imperialism policy and wanted to extend British domination over the whole of the Malay States to further protect its economic interest. To realize the intention, Sir Andrew Clarke, who was appointed as the new governor of the Straits Settlements replacing Sir Harry Ord in September 1873, was ordered to intervene in the internal affairs of the Malay States to solve the anarchical problems and to improve political and economic conditions.

8. Other Factors

There are several other factors contributing to the shift in British's foreign policy that could be considered as indirect or additional paths that lend support to the factors previously mentioned as follows:

Humanitarian Factors. Responsibility based on humanitarian ground prompted the British to intervene in the Malay States' internal affairs to impose guarantee over security of individuals and wealth. This feeling of responsibility is based on the policy promoted under Pax Britannica. However, some scholars believe that this ground of reasoning was merely a manipulated factor to give reason to the British to intervene in the Malay States' affairs and there are others who believe that this is a way of undermining the Malay civilization^{xviii} to indicate the superiority of British civilization. In the eyes of the British, according to Malcolm Caldwell, the Malay States were 'child-like' who require 'European guidance'.^{xix}

Sir Andrew Clarke's Idiosyncrasies. Upon his appointment as the new governor of the Straits Settlement, he was ordered to investigate the actual problems in the affairs of the Malay States and provide a complete report in terms of the current situation followed by suggestions to solve the problems to ensure continuous protection of British interest. However, Andrew Clarke had taken the initiative beyond the instruction given to him by the British Government by intervening in the power struggle among the Perak Malay Rulers in January 1874 by applying gunboat diplomacy, better known today as naval diplomacy.^{xx} The Pangkor Treaty signed on 20th January 1874 marked the official beginning and exercise of the British's direct intervention policy in the affairs of the Malay States, and the creation of the British Malaya administration.

9. Conclusion

The immediate effect of the direct intervention policy is the appointment of a Resident in each Malay State to advise the Sultans on various aspects of administrative matters including social, politics and economic, and the application of British laws and order except in matters involving the religious and Malay customary affairs which still came under the purview of the Sultans. The policy faced resistance from certain Malay quarters which led to a series of uprisings in Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Kelantan and Terengganu in the years between 1875 and 1928.

Under the direct intervention policy of the Malay States Monarchy, the British had succeeded to expand its domination in the Malayan Peninsular until its Independence on 31st August 1957. Based on the historical analysis, it is found that the British intervention in the Malay States affairs underwent a series of evolution process which progressed from mercantilism through imperialism and followed by colonialism, and from policies of non-intervention to indirect intervention and finally direct intervention. The whole process could be categorized as the various stages of the British intervention mechanism or tools in realizing its main objective, the colonization of the Malay States. The economic factor was the 'umbrella' that was carefully laid down covering the whole process of colonization. The direct intervention policy has brought about a myriad of immediate and long term effects to the Malay States in almost every dimension including politics, economics, social and legal, such as the formation of the Federated Malay States, the British Malaya Administration, the Malay chieftains resistance towards the British, the emergence of plural society, culturally or racially biased education system with the influx of the Chinese and Indian nationalities.

However there remain certain views on the causes, impacts and contribution of the British colonization due to the intervention policy yet to be thoroughly scrutinized. Some of these have come into play in Malaysia's contemporary views in relation to strategic-security and regional relations studies such as the significance of sea lane control especially in the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea by the establishment of the Straits Settlement. The control and surveillance over the two sea lanes have been factored into the formulation of certain parts of Malaysia's National Defence Policy, taking into consideration the realism thinking on the importance of international power inter-play.

The intervention policy has led to friction and breaking up of Malay States, Malay sovereignty, Malay world, Malay identity and entity, and Malay displacement. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty had resulted in the Malay world being divided into two main entities and identities culminated in the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation period of 1963 – 1966. The Bangkok Treaty in 1909 happens to be the worse legacy left by

the British. The “demarcation line” had resulted in the carving of Patani Empire where certain parts were apportioned to the British and others to Siam. The root cause of the on-going and unresolved Southern Thailand conflict or proxy war can be traced to this treaty. This issue does not only concern Thailand, but Malaysia is also inextricably involved due to the characteristics of the international anarchical system.

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End Notes:

- ⁱ Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya: *A History of Malaysia*, Palgrave Pub., (2nd Edt), Hampshire, 2001, page 111-112. According to the authors, Francis Light, a country trader entrusted with the negotiations, took formal possession of Penang in the name of King George III of Britain.
- ⁱⁱ Ibid, page 114. The Singapore Island came under the British administration was a very tremendous one due to the competition and trade interest to balance the Dutch hegemonic influences the Straits of Malacca route. According to the authors; *the Dutch action was a bald challenge for those Englishmen who were convinced that Britain must control the maritime route to China.....Raffles was convinced of the need to establish a British entrepot somewhere in the region which could become another staging post along the maritime route to China.....Raffles had hoped to use Riau, but found the Dutch already entrenched there. An alternative site was soon found. On 30 January 1819 Raffles signed a treaty with the temenggung of Riau-Johor, the territorial chief of Singapore, which gave the British the right to establish a factory on the island.*
- ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid, page 112 and 117. Malacca came under the British administration was a very episodically. Between 1795-1818, the Dutch hand over Malacca to the British intended to prevent any Dutch possession in Southeast Asia sub-region falling into French hands after the Napoleon conquered the Netherlands in January 1795. In 1818 until 1824 the Dutch continued control over Malacca, before the signed of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824.
- ^{iv} David Robertson: *A Dictionary of Modern Defence and Strategy*, Europa Pub. Ltd., London, 1987, page 32. According to the author; *David Hume, the 18th century philosopher, used the phrase in an essay, and claimed that it had been known throughout the ages. The 18th and 19th centuries are often referred to by historians as the classic age of the balance of power, especially as established by the Concert of Europe in post-Napoleonic Europe. It remains both a common practical policy and a major theoretical concept in international relations.* Based on this description, the concept of balance of power was not limited to the European theatre per se but had been expanded to the other region whereby the colonialisation took place i.e. in Southeast Asia sub-region.
- ^v Paul Kennedy: *Kebangkitan dan Kejatuhan Kuasa-Kuasa Besar, Perusahaan Ekonomi dan Konflik Ketenteraan Dari Tahun 1500 ke 2000*. (Terj.), DBP, Kuala Lumpur, 1994, page 197.
- ^{vi} Ibid., page 197.
- ^{vii} Birnie, A.: Deane, Phyllis and Cole, W.A.: *British Economic Growth 1688 – 1959*, Cambridge, 1967, page 29.
- ^{viii} Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell (Edt): Malaya, *The Making of A Neo-Colony*. Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation Pub., Nottingham, 1977, page 16.
- ^{ix} Ibid., page 20-21. Furthermore, in London itself, the part played by several companies as well such as the London agents of Paterson, Simons and Company, a firm whose partners had been active in a variety of ways in the Malay States for sometimes prior to 1874, and had come to realize from their own experience the necessity of political authority to back up business initiative, and secondly, by the Selangor Tin Company under the directorship of W.H. Read, a man of many interests focusing on the area, and well-connected in London. The British Companies had a hidden agenda – their intention was to break the Chinese monopoly in mining and smelting activities, to put them under the control of The British Straits Trading Company; a fact which can be readily seen as once the British succeeds to intervene in the Malay States affairs, the intention was manifested in a variety of forms, especially in land regulations in 1897 where the execution of which are not in the best interest of the Chinese and other Asian planters.

^x Yip Yat Hoong: *The Development of The Tin Mining Industry of Malaya*, Singapore, 1969, page 59.

^{xi} P.P. Courtenay: *A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya*, London, 1972.

^{xii} *Ibid.*, page 16.

^{xiii} Deliar Noer: *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900 – 42*, London, 1973, page 29.

^{xiv} D.J.M. Tate: *The Making of Modern South-East Asia*, Vol I, London, 1971, page 325.

^{xv} Baylis, J., Wirtz, J., Cohen, E. and Gray, C.S.: *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to strategic studies*, Oxford, 2002, page 6-7. One of the most important concept of international studies and relations is the concept of anarchy and power. According to the authors; *the clash between states is more difficult to resolve because there is no authoritative government, realists note that states have adopted a 'self-help' approach to their interests and especially their security.....Who wins in international relations does not depend on who is right according to some moral or legal ruling.....power determines who gets their way. In international relations, might makes right.*

^{xvi} This happens to be the biggest problem resulting from the newly introduced capitalism in the Malay world where the Sultans have realized the importance and significance of maintaining power in order to exert economic control over the states. As mentioned by Malcolm Caldwell on British's view of the anarchical situations on the great disturbances in the Malay States at the time were a result of disintegrative forces traceable to capitalist penetration into the region.

^{xvii} Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya: *Ibid.*, page 133. In their desire to safeguard the vital sea-borne trade centred in Singapore, the Straits settlements government placed great emphasis on the elimination of piracy.

^{xviii} *Ibid.*, page 154-155. In views of the British, 'civilization' naturally meant the adoption of English law, English government and, as far as possible, an English way of life. It was felt that no other culture could be better than the model of the British rule which represents a 'superior' culture.

^{xix} Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell (Edt.): *Ibid.*, page 14.

^{xx} David Robertson: *Ibid.*, page 219. Naval diplomacy has been practiced by all major naval powers including British. It consists of sailing ships or fleets close to the coast of smaller powers to intimidate them by reminding them of the force that could be exerted should the major power's interests be affected. It is related to the old British concept of gunboat diplomacy, where a minor naval bombardment of a small country would follow any hostile actions against British citizens or interests.